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Abstract. We study the performance of neural network models on ran-
dom geometric transformations and adversarial perturbations. Invariance
means that the models prediction remains unchanged when a geomet-
ric transformation is applied to an input. Adversarial robustness means
that the models prediction remains unchanged after small adversarial
perturbations of an input. In this paper, we show a quantitative trade-
off between rotation invariance and robustness. We empirically study the
following two cases: (a) change in adversarial robustness as we improve
only the invariance of equivariant models via training augmentation, (b)
change in invariance as we improve only the adversarial robustness using
adversarial training. We observe that the rotation invariance of equiv-
ariant models (StdCNNs and GCNNs) improves by training augmen-
tation with progressively larger random rotations but while doing so,
their adversarial robustness drops progressively, and very significantly on
MNIST. We take adversarially trained LeNet and ResNet models which
have good L∞ adversarial robustness on MNIST and CIFAR-10, respec-
tively, and observe that adversarial training with progressively larger
perturbations results in a progressive drop in their rotation invariance
profiles. Similar to the trade-off between accuracy and robustness known
in previous work, we give a theoretical justification for the invariance vs.
robustness trade-off observed in our experiments. We also give additional
empirical evidence for claim (a). We observe that the average distance of
the test points to the decision boundary reduces when models are trained
with larger rotations.
Keywords: Invariance · Adversarial Robustness · Neural Networks.
1 Introduction
Neural networks achieve state of the art accuracy on several standard datasets
used in image classification. However, their performance in the wild depends on
how well they can handle natural or non-adversarial transformations of input
seen in real-world data as well as known deliberate, adversarial attacks created
to fool the model.
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Natural or non-adversarial transformations seen in real-world images include
translations, rotations, and scaling. Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) are
translation-invariant or shift-invariant by design. Invariance to other symme-
tries, and especially rotations, have received much attention recently, e.g., Har-
monic Networks (H-Nets) [23], cyclic slicing and pooling [5], Transformation-
Invariant Pooling (TI-Pooling) [12], Group-equivariant Convolutional Neural
Networks (GCNNs) [3], Steerable CNNs [4], Deep Rotation Equivariant Net-
works (DREN) [13], Rotation Equivariant Vector Field Networks (RotEqNet)
[15], and Polar Transformer Networks (PTN) [7]. For a given symmetry group
G, a G-equivariant network learns a representation or feature map at every
intermediate layer such that any transformation g ∈ G applied to an input cor-
responds to an equivalent transformation of its representations. Any model can
improve its invariance to a given group of symmetries through sufficient training
augmentation. Equivariant models use efficient weight sharing [10] and require
smaller sample complexity to achieve better invariance. Equivariant models such
as CNNs and GCNNs too generalize well to progressively larger random rota-
tions, but only when their training data is augmented similarly.
Adversarial attacks on neural network models are certain, deliberate changes
to inputs that fool a highly accurate model but are unlikely to fool humans.
Given any neural network model, Szegedy et al. [20] show how to change the
pixel values of images only slightly so that the change is almost imperceptible
to human eye but makes highly accurate models misclassify. They find these
adversarial pixel-wise perturbations of small magnitude by maximizing the pre-
diction error of a given model using box-constrained L-BFGS. Goodfellow et al.
[8] propose Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) that adversarially perturbs x to
x′ = x+ sign (∇xJ(θ, x, y)). Here J(θ, x, y) is the loss function used to train the
network, x is the input and y is the target label and θ are the model parameters.
Goodfellow et al. [8] propose adversarial training, or training augmented with
points (x′, y), as a way to improve adversarial robustness of a model.
Subsequent work introduced multi-step variants of FGSM. Kurakin et al. [11]
use an iterative method to produce an attack vector. Madry et al. [14] proposed
the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack. Given any model, these attacks
produce adversarial perturbation for every test image x from a small `∞-ball
around it, namely, each pixel value xi is perturbed within [xi − , xi + ]. PGD
attack does so by solving an inner optimization by projected gradient descent
over `∞-ball of radius  around x, to approximate the optimal perturbation. Ad-
versarial training with PGD perturbations improves the adversarial robustness
of models and it is one of the best known defenses to make models robust to
perturbations of bounded `∞ norm on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets [14,1].
Recent work has looked at simultaneous robustness to multiple adversarial
attacks. Engstrom et al. [6] show that adversarial training with PGD makes
CNNs robust against perturbations of bounded `∞ norm but an adversarially
chosen combination of a small rotation and a translation can nevertheless still
fool these models. In Schott et al. [17], the authors shows that PGD adversarial
training is a good defense against perturbations of bounded `∞ norm but can
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be broken with adversarial perturbations of small `0 or `2 norm that are also
imperceptible to humans or have little semantic meaning for humans. Schott et
al. [17] show how to build models for MNIST dataset that are simultaneously
robust to perturbations of small `0, `2 and `∞ norms.
1.1 Problem formulation and our results
Let f be a neural network classifier trained on a training set of labeled images.
The accuracy of f is the fraction of test inputs x for which the predicted label
f(x) matches the true label y. Similarly, for a given adversarial attackA, the fool-
ing rate of A on f is the fraction of test inputs x+A(x) for which f(x+A(x)) 6=
f(x). For a given transformation T of the image space, f is said to be T -invariant
if the predicted label remains unchanged after the transformation T for all inputs,
i.e., f(Tx) = f(x), for all inputs x. If f is T -invariant and f(x+A(x)) 6= f(x),
for some input x and its adversarial perturbation A(x) with ‖A(x)‖p ≤ , then
by invariance f(Tx+TA(x)) = f(x+A(x)) 6= (f(x) = f(Tx)). Let T be a trans-
lation, rotation, or, more generally, a permutation of coordinates as considered
by Tramer and Boneh [21]. We have ‖TA(x)‖p = ‖A(x)‖p ≤ . Hence, TA(x)
is an adversarial perturbation for input Tx of small `p norm. When a change of
variables maps x to Tx by a permutation of coordinates, then the gradient and
T operators can be swapped. In other words, grad(f) at Tx is the same as T
applied to grad(f) at x. This gives a 1-1 correspondence between FGSM (and
PGD) perturbations of x and Tx, respectively, with `p norm at most . As a
corollary, the `p fooling rate for any T -invariant classifier f on the transformed
data {Tx : x ∈ X} must be equal to its `p fooling rate on the original data X .
A subtlety kicks in when f is not truly invariant, that is, f(Tx) = f(x),
for most inputs x but not all x. Define the rate of invariance of a classifier
f to a transformation T as the fraction of test images whose predicted labels
remain unchanged when T is applied to x, i.e., f(Tx) = f(x). For a class of
transformations, e.g., rotations upto degree [−θ◦,+θ◦], we define the rate of
invariance as the average rate of invariance over transformations T in this class.
The rate of invariance is 100% if the model f is truly invariant. When f is
not truly invariant, the interplay between the invariance under transformations
and robustness under adversarial perturbations of small `p-norm is subtle. This
interplay is exactly what we investigate.
In this paper, we study neural network models and the simultaneous interplay
between their rate of invariance for random rotations between [−θ◦,+θ◦], and
their adversarial robustness to pixel-wise perturbations of `∞ norm at most .
Measuring the robustness of a model to adversarial perturbations of `p norm at
most  is NP-hard [9,19]. Athalye et al. [1] compare most of the known adversarial
attacks and argue that PGD is among the strongest. Therefore, we use a models
accuracy on test data adversarially perturbed using PGD as a proxy for its
adversarial robustness.
Unlike previous studies by Engstrom et al. [6] and Tramer and Boneh [21],
we do not fix the magnitude of pixel-wise adversarial perturbations (e.g., say
 = 0.3), nor do we limit ourselves to small rotations up to ±30◦. Another
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important difference is we consider random rotations instead of adversarial rota-
tions. We compute the rate of invariance of a given model on inputs rotated by
a random angle between [−θ◦,+θ◦], for θ varying in the range [0, 180]. Similarly,
we normalize the underlying dataset, and compute the accuracy of a given model
on test inputs adversarially perturbed using PGD attack of `∞ norm at most ,
for  varying in the range [0, 1].
We empirically study the following: (a) change in `∞ adversarial robustness
as we improve only the rate of rotation invariance using training augmentation
with progressively larger rotations, (b) change in invariance as we improve only
adversarial robustness using PGD adversarial training with progressively larger
`∞-norm of pixel-wise perturbations.
We study equivariant models, StdCNNs and GCNNs, as well as LeNet and
ResNet models used by Madry et al. [14]. Equivariant models, especially GCNNs,
when trained with random rotation augmentations come very close to being
truly rotation invariant [3,4,2]. StdCNNs are translation-equivariant by design
and GCNNs are rotation-equivariant by design through clever weight sharing
[10]. However, these models do not have high rate of invariance if their training
data is not sufficiently augmented. This appears to be folklore so we do not
elaborate on this. LeNet and ResNet models adversarially trained with PGD are
among the best known `∞ adversarially robust models on MNIST and CIFAR-
10, respectively, as shown by Madry et al. [14], and reconfirmed by Athalye
et al. [1]. In other words, equivariant models with training augmentation and
PGD-trained LeNet and ResNet models essentially represent the two separate
solutions known currently for achieving invariance and adversarial robustness,
respectively.
Our two main observations are as follows.
(i) Equivariant models (StdCNNs and GCNNs) progressively improve their rate
of rotation invariance when their training is augmented with progressively
larger random rotations but while doing so, their `∞ adversarial robustness
drops progressively. This drop or trade-off is very significant on MNIST.
(ii) LeNet and ResNet models adversarially trained using progressively larger
`∞-norm attacks improve their adversarial robustness but while doing so,
their rate of invariance to random rotations upto ±θ◦ drops progressively.
We give a theoretical justification for the invariance vs. robustness trade-
off observed in our experiments (see Theorem 1) by building upon the ideas in
previous work on accuracy vs robustness trade-off [22,21].
Related Work. Schott et al. [17] study simultaneous robustness to adversarial
perturbations of small `0, `2, and `∞-norm. Tramer and Boneh [21] show an im-
possibility result by exhibiting a data distribution where no binary classifier can
have substantially better-than-random accuracy simultaneously against both `∞
and `1 perturbations. They consider a spatial perturbation that permutes a small
number of coordinates of the input to model a combination of a small transla-
tion and a small rotation. They also construct a distribution and show that no
model can have good accuracy simultaneously against both `∞ perturbations
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and spatial perturbations. They empirically validate this claim on MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets for simultaneous robustness against `∞ adversarial perturba-
tion and an adversarially chosen combination of translations upto ±3 pixels and
rotations upto ±30◦. Intuitively and theoretically, it has been argued by Tsipras
et al. [22] and Tramer and Boneh [21] that small, adversarial pixel-wise perturba-
tions and small, adversarial geometric transformations are essentially dissimilar
attacks focusing on different features, due to which a simultaneous solution to
both may be inherently difficult. They do not postulate any gradual trade-off be-
tween invariance and robustness. They do not consider group-equivariant models
such as GCNNs, a natural choice for invariance to geometric transformations.
2 Rotation invariance vs. `∞ adversarial robustness
In this section, we present our main result about the interplay between rotation
invariance and `∞ adversarial robustness of models on MNIST and CIFAR-10
data. In Subsection 2.1, we take StdCNN and GCNN models (see details in Sec-
tion 4) and study their rotation invariance and `∞ adversarial robustness, as we
train them with random rotations of progressively larger degree. In Subsection
2.2, we take LeNet and ResNet models [14] and study their rotation invariance
and `∞ adversarial robustness, as we do PGD adversarial training with progres-
sively larger `∞ norms.
We present our experimental results as rotation invariance profiles and ad-
versarial robustness profiles explained below.
Rotation invariance means that the predicted labels of an image and any of
its rotations should be the same. Since most datasets are centered, we restrict
our attention to rotations about the center of each image. We quantify rotation
invariance by measuring the rate of invariance or the fraction of test images
whose predicted label remains the same after rotation by a random angle between
[−θ◦, θ◦]. As θ varies from 0 to 180, we plot the rate of invariance. We call this
the rotation invariance profile of a given model.
Adversarial robustness means that the predicted labels of an image and its
adversarial perturbation should be the same. We quantify the `∞ adversarial
robustness of a given model to a fixed adversarial attack (e.g., PGD) and a fixed
`∞ norm  ∈ [0, 1] by (1 - fooling rate), i.e., the fraction of test inputs for which
their predicted label does not change after adversarial perturbation. We plot this
for  varying from 0 to 1. We call this the robustness profile of a given model.
Convention used in the legends of our figures. We use the following convention
in the legends of some plots. A coloured line labeled A/B indicates that the
training data is augmented with random rotations from [−A◦, A◦] and the test
data is augmented with random rotations from [−B◦, B◦]. If A (resp. B) is
zero it means the training data (resp. test data) is unrotated. If the model is
trained with random rotations from [−A◦, A◦] and the test data is randomly
rotated with varying B to draw the plot, we only mention A and not B, which
is self-explanatory.
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2.1 Effect of rotation invariance on l∞ adversarial robustness
For any fixed θ ∈ [0, 180], we take an equivariant model, namely, StdCNN or
GCNN, and augment its training data by random rotations from [−θ◦,+θ◦]. Fig-
ure 1(left), Figure 2(left) shows how the robustness profile of StdCNN change on
MNIST and CIFAR-10 respectively, as we increase the degree θ used in train-
ing augmentation of the model. We use PGD adversarial attack for MNIST
and CIFAR-10. Figure 1(right) and Figure 2(right) show the rotation invariance
profile of the same models on MNIST, CIFAR-10 respectively.
The black line in Figure 1 (left), shows that the adversarial robustness of a
StdCNN which is trained to handle rotations up to ±180 degrees on MNIST,
drops by more than 50%, even when the  budget for PGD attack on unrotated
MNIST is only 0.1. The black line in Figure 1 (right), shows this models rotation
invariance profile - this model is invariant to larger rotations in the test data.
This can be contrasted with the model depicted by the red line - this StdCNN
is trained to handle rotations up to 60 degrees. The rotation invariance profile
of this model is below that of the model depicted by the black line and so it
is not invariant to large rotations. However this model can handle adversarial
`∞-perturbations up to 0.3 on unrotated data, with an accuracy more than 80%
- this can be seen from the red line in Figure 1 (left).
From these plots it is clear that the rotation invariance of these models im-
proves by training augmentation but at the cost of their adversarial robustness,
indicating a trade-off between invariance to rotations and adversarial robustness.
The above observations, of there being a trade-off between handling larger rota-
tions with training augmentation and handling larger adversarial perturbations
is seen in GCNNs also. This can be seen from Figures 3 and Figure 4. The plots
are very similar to what we observe with StdCNNs.
Fig. 1. On MNIST, StdCNN trained with varying random rotations in [−θ◦, θ◦] range.
(left) Robustness profile, (right) Rotation invariance profile.
Invariance vs. Robustness Trade-Off in Neural Networks 7
Fig. 2. On CIFAR-10, StdCNN/VGG16 trained with varying random rotations in
[−θ◦, θ◦] range. (left) Robustness profile, (right) Rotation invariance profile.
Fig. 3. On MNIST, GCNN trained with varying random rotations in [−θ◦, θ◦] range.
(left) Robustness profile, (right) Rotation invariance profile.
Fig. 4. On CIFAR-10, GCNN/VGG16 trained with varying random rotations in
[−θ◦, θ◦] range. (left) Robustness profile, (right) Rotation invariance profile.
8 Sandesh Kamath, Amit Deshpande, and K V Subrahmanyam
Fig. 5. For PGD adversarially trained LeNet based model from [14] on MNIST (left)
Rotation invariance profile, (right) Robustness profile. Different colored lines represent
models adversarially trained with different `∞ budgets  ∈ [0, 1].
Fig. 6. For PGD adversarially trained ResNet based model from [14] on CIFAR-10
(left) Rotation invariance profile, (right) Robustness profile. Different colored lines
represent models adversarially trained with different `∞ budgets  ∈ [0, 1].
2.2 Effect of `∞ adversarial training on rotation invariance
The most common approach to improve adversarial robustness is adversarial
training, i.e., training the model on adversarially perturbed training data. Ad-
versarial training with PGD attack is one of the strongest known defenses on
MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets (see [1]).
For any fixed  ∈ [0, 1] we adversarially train our models, LeNet and ResNet,
as done by Madry et al. [14] with PGD adversarial perturbations with `∞ budget
. As in Madry et al. [14] we use the LeNet model for MNIST and the ResNet
model for CIFAR-10. We then plot their rotation invariance profiles and robust-
ness profiles. Each colored line in Figure 5 and Figure 6 corresponds to a model
adversarially trained with a different value of .
On MNIST, adversarial training with PGD with larger  results in a drop in
the invariance profile of LeNet based model - in Figure 5 (left), the yellow line
(PGD with  = 0.4) is below the light blue line (PGD with  = 0.1). Similar
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qualitative drop holds for the ResNet based model too on CIFAR-10, as can be
seen from Figure 6 (left). In other words, adversarial training with progressively
larger  leads to the drop in the rate of invariance on the test data.
To complete this picture we plot the robustness profile curves of the LeNet
and ResNet based model for MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. It is known
that as these models are trained with PGD using larger  budget their adversarial
robustness increases. The robustness profile curves of the LeNet model trained
with larger PGD budget dominates the robustness profile curve of the same
model trained with a smaller PGD budget - the red line in Figure 5 (right),
dominates the light blue line. This is true of the ResNet based model too, as can
be seen from Figure 6 (right).
3 Invariance vs. robustness trade-off proof
In this section, we give theoretical demonstration of an invariance-vs-robustness
trade-off similar to our experiments. We consider an `∞ adversarial perturbation
A(x) that perturbs the coordinates of any input x by a small value. Observe that
rotation by 0◦ leaves any input x unchanged whereas rotation by 180◦ keeps
the center pixel fixed and makes pairwise swaps for all other pixels radially
opposite to each other around the center. We consider a random permutation of
coordinates r(x) to mimic picking a uniformly random rotation from {0◦, 180◦}.
We consider a joint distribution on input-label pairs such that there exists a
classifier of high accuracy. However, we prove that no classifier can have high
accuracy (w.r.t. true labels) after the random transformation r(x) as well as
the adversarial perturbation A(x), simultaneously. Even though our theorem is
about accuracy after r(x) instead of the rate of invariance, and accuracy after
A(x) instead of (1 - fooling rate), these values are close for any classifier that
has high accuracy on the original data distribution.
Consider a random input-label pair (X,Y ) with X = (X0, X1, . . . , X2d) tak-
ing values in R2d+1 and Y taking values in {−1, 1} generated as follows. The
class label Y takes value ±1 with probability 1/2 each. X0 | Y = y takes value y
with probability p and −y with probability 1−p, for some p ≥ 1/2. The remain-
ing coordinates are independent and normally distributed with X2t−1 | Y = y
as N(3y/
√
d, 1) and X2t | Y = y as N(−3y/
√
d, 1), for 1 ≤ t ≤ d. First
of all, there exists a classifier f∗(x) = sign
(∑d
t=1 x2t−1
)
with high accuracy
Pr
(
sign
(∑d
i=1X2t−1
)
= Y
)
> 99% for this data distribution. The proof of
this follows from the three-sigma rule for normal distributions, and is similar to
the equation (4) in Subsection 2.1 of Tsipras et al. [22].
Let A(x) denote an adversarial perturbation for (x, y) given by (A(x))0 =
0, and (A(x))2t−1 = −6y/
√
d, (A(x))2t = 6y/
√
d, for 1 ≤ t ≤ d. Note that
‖A(x)‖∞ = 6/
√
d, for all x ∈ R2d+1.
Given any input x ∈ R2d+1, let r(x) be a random transformation of x that
leaves x unchanged as r(x) = x with probability 1/2, and swaps successive odd-
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even coordinate-pairs (x2t−1, x2t) for 1 ≤ t ≤ d to get (x0, x2, x1, . . . , x2d, x2d−1),
with probability 1/2.
Theorem 1. Given input distributions defined above with 1/2 ≤ p < 1− δ, for
any classifier f : R2d+1 → {−1, 1}, both Pr (f(r(X)) = Y ) and Pr (f(X +A(X)) = Y )
cannot be more than 1− δ simultaneously.
Proof. The random transformation r(X) leaves X unchanged with probability
1/2 but with the remaining 1/2 probability, it makes the data distribution of
r(X) the same as X +A(X). Thus,
Pr (f(r(X)) = Y )
=
1
2
Pr (f(X) = Y ) +
1
2
Pr (f(X +A(X)) = Y ) ,
where the LHS probability is over r,X, Y while the RHS probabilities are only
over X,Y . Let Gy denote (X1, . . . , X2d) | Y = y. The adversarial perturbation
X +A(X) turns Gy into G−y.
Pr (f(X +A(X)) 6= Y )
=
1
2
∑
y∈{−1,1}
Pr (f((X0, G−y)) = −y)
=
1
2
{ ∑
y∈{−1,1}
p Pr (f((y,G−y)) = −y)
+ (1− p) Pr (f((−y,G−y)) = −y)
}
≥ 1− p
2p
{ ∑
y∈{−1,1}
(1− p) Pr (f((y,G−y)) = −y)
+ p Pr (f((−y,G−y)) = −y)
}
=
1− p
2p
{ ∑
y∈{−1,1}
(1− p) Pr (f((−y,Gy)) = y)
+ p Pr (f((y,Gy)) = y)
}
=
1− p
p
Pr (f(X) = Y ) .
Plugging this in the above expression of Pr (f(r(X)) = Y ) we get
Pr (f(r(X)) = Y ) +
2p− 1
2(1− p) Pr (f(X +A(X)) = Y )
≤ p
2(1− p) .
If both Pr (f(r(X)) = Y ) and Pr (f(X +A(X)) = Y ) are at least 1−δ, then the
above inequality implies 1− δ ≤ p. Thus, if p < 1− δ, we get a contradiction.
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3.1 Additional empirical evidence : Average perturbation distance
to the boundary.
For each test image, adversarial attacks find perturbations of the test point
with small `∞ norm that would change the prediction of the given model. Most
adversarial attacks do so by finding the directions in which the loss function of
the model changes the most. In order to explain why these networks become
vulnerable to pixel-wise attacks as they learn more rotations, we see how the
distance of the test points to the decision boundary changes as the networks
learn larger rotations. This is abstractly depicted in Figure 7 where we show the
distance of a test point x0 to the boundary D0 (resp. D180) when the model is
trained with zero (resp. ±180◦) rotations.
We use the L2 attack vectors obtained by DeepFool [16] for the datapoints
under attack. We take the norm of this attack vector as an approximation to the
shortest distance of the test point to the decision boundary. For each of the test
points we collect the perturbation vectors given by DeepFool attack and report
the average perturbation distance. We plot this average distance as the datasets
are augmented with larger rotations.
Our experiments show that as the networks learn larger rotations with aug-
mentation, the average perturbation distance falls. So as (symmetric) networks
become invariant to rotations, they are more vulnerable to pixel-wise attacks.
The plots in Figures 8, 9, 10, 11 show this for StdCNNs and GCNNs on
MNIST and CIFAR-10. To make our point we plot the accuracy of these networks
and also the average perturbation distance of the test points alongside in one
figure. The blue line in Figure 8(left) shows the accuracy of a StdCNN on MNIST
when both the training data and test data are augmented with θ, as θ ranges
from 0 to 180. The green line in Figure 8(left) shows the accuracy of the StdCNN
model when the train is augmented with random rotations upto θ, and the test is
augmented with rotations upto θ and is also perturbed with PGD of `∞ norm 0.3.
The red line shows the accuracy when the test is not augmented with rotations
but is PGD perturbed with `∞ norm 0.3.
The red line Figure 8(right) shows the average perturbation distance of the
unrotated test points when the network is trained with rotations upto θ. The
green line shows the average perturbation distance of test points which are aug-
mented with rotations upto θ - this is about 5 when θ is 0◦ (the point on the
y-axis where the curves begin). As the network is trained with random rotations
up to 180◦ the average perturbation distance of the augmented test drops below
3.5. Figure 8(left) shows that that the PGD accuracy has dropped from around
85% for the network at 0◦ to 30% at 180◦ (the corresponding green line on the
left). When the test is perturbed by PGD, the accuracy of the StdCNN with
training data augmented with rotations is better when the test is not augmented
with rotations than if the test were also augmented with rotations.
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Fig. 7.Distance of point x0 to decision boundaryD180 obtained by augmenting training
set with random rotations in range [−180◦, 180◦] is different compared to the decision
boundary D0 obtained with no training augmentation.
Fig. 8. Accuracy of StdCNN on MNIST with/without PGD ( = 0.3), on rotated and
unrotated test. Train/test if augmented are with random rotations in [−θ◦, θ◦]. (left)
Accuracy, (right) Avg. Perturbation Distance.
Fig. 9. Accuracy of GCNNs on MNIST with/without PGD ( = 0.3) on rotated and
unrotated test. Train/test if augmented are with random rotations in [−θ◦, θ◦]. (left)
Accuracy, (right) Avg. Perturbation Distance.
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Fig. 10. Accuracy of StdCNNs/VGG16 on CIFAR-10, with/without FGSM ( = 0.01)
on rotated and unrotated test with  = 0.01. Train/test if augmented are with random
rotations in [−θ◦, θ◦]. (left) Accuracy, (right) Avg. Perturbation Distance.
Fig. 11. Accuracy of GCNNs/VGG16 on CIFAR-10, with/without FGSM ( = 0.01)
on rotated and unrotated test. Train/test if augmented are with random rotations in
[−θ◦, θ◦]. (left) Accuracy, (right) Avg. Perturbation Distance.
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4 Details of experiments
All experiments performed on neural network-based models were done using
MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets with appropriate augmentations applied to the
train/validation/test set.
Data sets. MNIST dataset consists of 70, 000 images of 28 × 28 size, divided
into 10 classes. 55, 000 used for training, 5, 000 for validation and 10, 000 for
testing. CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60, 000 images of 32×32 size, divided into
10 classes. 40, 000 used for training, 10, 000 for validation and 10, 000 for testing.
Equivariant Model Architectures. For the MNIST based experiments we use the
network architecture of GCNN as given in Cohen and Welling [3]. The Std-
CNN architecture is similar to the GCNN except that the operations are as per
CNNs. Refer to Table 1 for details. For the CIFAR-10 based experiments we
use the VGG16 architecture as given in Simonyan and Zisserman [18] and its
GCNN equivalent is obtained replacing the various layer operations with equiva-
lent GCNN operations as given in Cohen and Welling [3]. This is similar to how
we obtained a GCNN architecture from StdCNN for the MNIST based experi-
ments. Input training data was augmented with random cropping and random
horizontal flips.
Adversarially Robust Model Architectures. For the adversarial training experi-
ments we used the LeNet based architecture for MNIST and the ResNet archi-
tecture for CIFAR-10. Both these models are exactly as given in Madry et al.
[14].
Table 1. Architectures used for the MNIST experiments
Standard CNN GCNN
Conv(10,3,3) + Relu P4ConvZ2(10,3,3) + Relu
Conv(10,3,3) + Relu P4ConvP4(10,3,3) + Relu
Max Pooling(2,2) Group Spatial Max Pooling(2,2)
Conv(20,3,3) + Relu P4ConvP4(20,3,3) + Relu
Conv(20,3,3) + Relu P4ConvP4(20,3,3) + Relu
Max Pooling(2,2) Group Spatial Max Pooling(2,2)
FC(50) + Relu FC(50) + Relu
Dropout(0.5) Dropout(0.5)
FC(10) + Softmax FC(10) + Softmax
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5 Conclusion
We observe that as equivariant models (StdCNNs and GCNNs) are trained with
progressively larger rotations their rotation invariance improves but at the cost of
their adversarial robustness. Adversarial training with perturbations of progres-
sively increasing norms improves the robustness of LeNet and ResNet models,
but with a resulting drop in their rate of invariance. We give a theoretical justi-
fication for the invariance-vs-robustness trade-off observed in our experiments.
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